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David Auerbach on literature, tech, film, etc.

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William Gass on Writing

William Gass on his profession:

The contemporary American writer is in no way a part of the social and political scene. He is therefore not muzzled, for no one fears his bite; nor is he called upon to compose. Whatever work he does must proceed from a reckless inner need. The world does not beckon, nor does it greatly reward. This is not a boast or a complaint. It is a fact. Serious writing must nowadays be written for the sake of the art. The condition I describe is not extraordinary. Certain scientists, philosophers, historians, and many mathematicians do the same, advancing their causes as they can. One must be satisfied with that.

Yes, but cause? I didn’t know that there was one. Neurologists can spend years analyzing dopamine receptors in the faint hopes of a distant total understanding of the mind-body problem and associated fringe benefits, but even philosophy has more of a directional mechanism through peer acclamation, regardless of how arbitrary it can be. (Also note the purposeful exclusion of art and music, which are presumably more “rewarding”.)

Literature throws off far more chaff–in the sense of directionless, ephemeral entertainments–than almost any other liberal arts discipline because it is less regimented; it is emphatically empirical, even at its most abstract. Attempts to proceed from theory are often disastrous (see Iris Murdoch and Elias Canetti, but also Chernyshevsky’s What is To Be Done?, etc.). If you wade through the fiction section at a bookstore, it’s amazing how little older work is present as a percentage of the total books, and how transitory the appeal and designs of most of what’s being written are. I have to go to the university library to find a copy of Gotthelf’s influential and significant “The Black Spider.” There is no plan for the future of literature, nor can there be one under the definition of literature as it is understood. “Movements” are ephemeral and dwarfed by exceptions and detractors. Surrealism in my mind is much more of a piece in art than in literature; situationism (and its bastard child actionism) made itself felt more strongly in any discipline but literature. At its most absurd, Wyndham Lewis’s paintings stand in his one-man Vorticism movement a lot more comfortably than his novels.

Gass’s implicit message, as opposed to the explicit one of private despair and resilience, is that writers, at least recently, place themselves in their artistic stream less as trendsetters and waypoints than as individuals. This has its bad aspects: rampant individualism leads to lack of direction and accusations of being a crank. And it’s frustrating to crawl through the onslaught to find pearls of novelty and meaning. But for me, it’s still a greater discipline in conception, though rarely in practice.

As a tangent/afterthought, it’s helpful (as always) to look at the world of science-fiction, which has been more chummy and insular than the world of “regular” fiction. It also possesses less of a critical/academic infrastructure for delivering accolades to the most worthy work, despite the best efforts of people like John Clute. One writer/critic in the field once said that discerning science-fiction critics had to be willing to read an awful lot of terrible and mediocre genre books–and thus, unless you’re a peculiar sort of masochist who enjoys boredom, enjoy them–just to be able to find the good/great ones. I don’t see any reason why this can’t apply to all fiction.

The Melancholy of Resistance, Laszlo Krasznahorkai

Geegaw points me to Giornale Nuovo‘s review of Laszlo Krasznahorkai’s The Melancholy of Resistance, and since the book seems somewhat relevant to the day’s events, I offer my commentary.

The book is nominally about a circus that comes to a small, anonymous, Hungarian town. The circus has two main features: first, a really huge cadaver of a whale (yes, that would be a Leviathan); and second, the Prince, a homunculus-like figure who sows nihilism and violence, and eventually stirs the town’s people into a frenzy of rioting and killing, which is responded to in kind by the police.

Through this pass two sympathetic figures, the naive man-child Valuska, who does performances of the heavenly bodies in motion for bar patrons, and his mentor Mr. Eszter, who is obsessed with a project of retuning a piano to “natural” harmonies and abandoning the well/equal-temperment that was used as the basis for what Krasznahorkai evidently considers to be the peak of aesthetic achievement, “The Well-Tempered Clavier.” Krasznahorkai’s explanations are not especially clear, which is unfortunate, since it’s clearly the major metaphor of the book.

For reference, this explanation seems good, and for those of you with time on your hands, this essay on “Pythagorean Tuning and Medieval Polyphony” seems awfully interesting. The Chicago Reader offers a somewhat-helpful summary, and while this may not be helpful, it’s pretty amusing. The first piece concludes with a great passage:

There are four main reasons why modern scholars have lost interest in the question of what is the best tuning system. First, in the 1930s, Carl Seashore measured the pitch accuracy of real performers and showed that singers and violinists are remarkably inaccurate. For non-fixed-pitch instruments, the pitch accuracy is on the order of 25 cents. Yet Western listeners (and musicians) are not noticeable disturbed by the pitch intonation of professional performers. Secondly, on average, professional piano tuners fail to tune notes more accurately than about 8 cents. This means that even if performers could perform very accurately, they would find it difficult to find suitable instruments. Thirdly, listeners seemingly adapt to whatever system they have been exposed to. Most Western listeners find just intonation “weird” sounding rather than “better”. Moreover, professional musicians appear to prefer equally tempered intervals to their just counterparts. See the results of Vos 1986. Finally, pitch perception has been shown to be categorical in nature. In vision, many shades of red will be perceived as “red”. Similarly, listeners tend to mentally “re-code” mis-tuned pitches so they are experienced as falling in the correct category. Mis-tuning must be remarkably large (>50 cents) before they draw much attention. This insensitivity is especially marked for short duration sounds — which tend to dominant music-making.

But no matter, since Eszter’s obsession is with finding the harmony of the spheres and returning to mathematically pure intervals; all those nasty intervals are to him the indicators of “an indifferent power which offered disappointment at every turn.” But he doesn’t have much luck; in his purer tunings, Bach sounds awful.

After the riots, order is re-estabished by Eszter’s estranged wife, Mrs. Eszter, who cheerfully and aggressively implements new martial law in light of the need to exert control over the town. She is the sort who was born to fill a power vacuum, and she stands in opposition to both Eszter and Valuska, representing the human capacity towards control, organization, and power; she’s effective, functional, but brutal and arbitrary. Just like the imposition of equal temperament on music (it is all but said).

And when Mr. Eszter retunes his piano back to equal temperament at the end of the book so he can again hear the glory of Bach without his ears bleeding…you can guess what that means. Krasznahorkai’s moral position is ambivalent, but his ideological layout seems to still be derived from Hobbes (and to some extent, Burke): we are given limited natural tools out of which we construct edifices that can reach heights of beauty as well as oppress and dullen. But they remain arbitrary, able to be torn down and built back up. Eszter’s appreciation of equal temperament is as good as it’s going to get.

(I don’t agree with this; I actually think there are significant problems with this metaphor, but the book offers enough to chew on that I’m willing to take it on its own terms.)

Krasznahorkai manages to end the book with a masterstroke, though, with a stunning, sustained description of the body’s biology, which he reveals as a more precise metaphor than temperament. The drama offsets the nagging feeling that Krasznahorkai has left a few loose ends hanging. For the record, Eszter ends up fine, and Valuska is beaten but alive.

So I think about this book while watching television and seeing the statue go down for the Nth time, and the looting and the anarchy and the celebrations and the violence, and I think the book may be too nihilistic, not for its painting of inherent natural imperfection or the implication of destruction in every creative act, but for its lack of differentiation: to use the metaphor, for being unwilling to distinguish one tuning from another. The resignation, or lack of attention, makes the book dark for the wrong reason. In pursuing an ornate Faberge egg of a metaphor, Krasznahorkai loses sight of a complex anthropological standpoint and ends up as a reductionist. The book sets lofty philosophical goals and makes immense progress towards them, but I do not find it fully-formed.

As a footnote, the movie adaptation, The Werckmeister Harmonies nearly obscures the main thrust of the book and goes for a more tepid, sensory approach, turning the complexities of the book into a parable.

Analytic Philosophy: Doctor Fact is Knocking at the Door!

Gary Sauer-Thompson delivers a missive on the evolution of analytic philosophy:

Many toiled in the analytic vineyard in the noonday sun to show that we were only looking at a picture not absolute truth. Dewey, Wittgenstein, Kuhn, Putnam, Charles Taylor come to mind. Their labors succeeded in breaking the stranglehold of a science-centered expert culture in the liberal university; a culture obsessed with its theory of everything written in a few equations, a hostility to the common life and a big contempt for a literary culture.

I don’t disagree with the sentiment, but analytic philosophy, and its particular pretenses and failings, deserves closer examination.

Analytic philosophy started off at the extreme. Proto-analytics like Frege and Russell lay the groundwork for a verificationist model of the world. The confusion that arose post-Wittgenstein came from the Viennese Circle’s appropriation of what they thought was a dismissal of metaphysical statements as nonsense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. What the analytics broke early on was the hold of metaphysics. Carl Hempel’s early papers are dismissive of anything that can’t be assigned a definitive truth value. Rudolph Carnap, one of the most extreme of the logical positivists, shows a great esteem for science, but disapproves of the culture surrounding it; science is too metaphysical for him.

But over time, analytics made the move back towards some notion of metaphysics. They did so using the most mathematical and scientific language possible, leading into endless discussions of material constitution, possible worlds, and debates between essentialism and non-essentialism.

The more esoteric blends of analytic philosophy maintained pretenses of scientific rigor. Willard Quine and Wilfred Sellars approached metaphysics as Frege had approached math and dug themselves into logically consistent but terribly obscure holes. Quine refined and rewrote Wittgenstein’s logical atomism into a network of interdependent atoms, none independent, even while tearing down traditional concepts of metaphysics.

Yet it was the more constructivist approaches, like those that came from Kripke, that caught on. By positing essential “things” with essential and non-essential properties, entirely new problems could be generated that led to statements with definite truth values, statements claiming basic metaphysical principles. Consider normative ethics, with its calculi of moral standing and well-being. It is the study of the mathematical manipulation of what psychologists can’t quantify.

The irony here, I always thought, was that it was the reintroduction of debatable metaphysics that gave analytic philosophy its power. The early verificationist approaches hit a dead end so quickly that there was almost no place to go but to metaphysics, and to establish a set of dogma as a tradition to work within, rather than as assumptions to be questioned. The debate between nominalists (those believing in particulars) and realists (those believing in universals) would have been anathema to Carl Hempel and the positivists in the 30’s, but not to their scions (and even some of them themselves–I know Hempel mellowed considerably) thirty to forty years later. Bernard Williams and David Armstrong had at least as much influence as Quine, because their approaches were more conducive towards productive work, and the manufacturing of problems to be debated and solved. An outstanding thinker like Donald Davidson sometimes seems shackled by assumptions, like the bugbear of the mental/physical divide, that his papers have to work within.

But I’d argue that it’s these restrictions and these signposts that allowed When Rorty attempted, with only partial success, to tear the house down by bringing in relativism (cultural and otherwise) and pragmatism, the metaphysics held it up. The edifice was too strong and too full of shared assumptions to fall victim to an attack that went in the wrong direction, tearing down rather than building up.

(I’d also say that Rorty’s approach is not especially compatible with continental thinkers for the same reason: his version of pragmatism is too destructive towards cultural theory, and possibly even towards pure deconstruction. But that’s a different subject….)

Oulipo Postscript: Because They’re There

Having roughly delineated the areas of generative writing mechanisms and how their purposes can be at odds with traditional notions of “meaningful” work, a personal statement. I discovered the Oulipo as a teenager through a series of Martin Gardner Scientific American articles, which focused on the most mathematical and formal of their work: the long palindromes, N+7, the million zillion sonnets, the lipograms. Most of this work was not readily available; most of it wasn’t even translated. But I kept the names in mind and bought what I could.

Like Eudaemonist, I was fascinated by Perec’s La Disparition, though I didn’t have the necessary French to read it. I tried a few (unfinished, unsatisfying) exercises in the same mode. By the time I got to college it had been translated as A Void, but I found that in the intervening years with their intervening troubles, Perec’s conceits had ceased to interest me or resonate with me. The trick could not, in my mind, be justified in execution, only in theory, and the resolute attempt to bring everything in line with the motif read as quaint. The final bit of Life: A User’s Manual, that the puzzle-maker’s last piece is a “W” but the whole is the shape of an “X”, seemed trivially self-defeating rather than profound.

It applied to other works. I could admire Ulysses for its structural properties but only warm to them as far as they related to the business between Stephen and Bloom. I never did get through Tristram Shandy.

I’m still stunned by the amount of effort and care put into the arrangement of such works, and sometimes the willingness to make things so much more difficult. I don’t plan on looking down on them from the pinnacle of awesome respect for their achievements, but they still are very useful reference points.

Oulipo Tangent: Milorad Pavic

The difference between the works most closely identified with Oulipo writers (Calvino’s Castle of Crossed Destinies, Queneau’s Exercises in Style) and those works which, while in the same exploratory spirit, don’t quite coexist in the same genre is them, like Sladek’s below, John Barth and Robert Coover’s metafictional spirals, or Tristram Shandy, is often the existence of a procedural gimmick. If the clef to a roman is an easily referenced generative device or structural ploy, the work can seem that much more mathematical and clever.

The danger is that the gimmick becomes the book. Milorad Pavic’s Landscape Painted with Tea is based around a crossword puzzle, but the device does not seem to justify an entire book, which is otherwise erudite and well-written. But more interesting is Pavic’s Dictionary of the Khazars, a self-proclaimed “lexicon novel” based around Eco-like historical research and mythology. But what is the one thing it is known for, the thing that became its main marketing point? It’s the thing so significant it made it into the rec.arts.books FAQ:

12) What is the difference between the male and female editions of DICTIONARY OF THE KHAZARS by Milorad Pavic?

The differing paragraph is given in both forms. (And is it just me, or is the male version eerily reminiscent of Borges’ “The Garden of Forking Paths”?)

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