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David Auerbach on literature, tech, film, etc.

Tag: germany (page 3 of 3)

The Twofold Vibration, Raymond Federman

There is something niggling about this book. It is, as Ray Davis has described, one of those works which deals with a deep trauma through literary extravagance. You could even say that it is about dealing with deep trauma through such extravagance. The trauma is the Holocaust, and if the work is not as arbitrarily generated as Beckett’s Watt, it tries its best. And there is something niggling about the effort.

(“Niggling” might make a less pretentious and more value-neutral substitute for “uncanny.”)

It’s not the metafictional artifice, with its fourth wall eternally under construction. Federman introduces himself at the beginning and discusses how he came to arrive at the book, and how his two assistant narrators, Namredef and Moinous, are going to help him talk about this horny old Holocaust survivor writer who is about to be exiled to another planet on the eve of the millenium. (The book was published in 1982.) The old man, we’re told, was born in the same year as Federman’s father. Federman himself discusses the two narrators here.

It’s not the intentionally perfunctory science fiction trappings. Federman dispatches them early on and only returns to them obliquely, when he gets involved with the Jane Fonda stand-in “June Fanon,” clearly in her post-Barbarella phase. He drops Lem and Bradbury’s names, but is content to sling a few insults at generic science fiction: “most science-fiction tends lamentably towards unconvincing futuristic descriptions and explications of the impossible…with simplistic characters and melodramatic plots which animate elementary didacticism.” Most metafiction tends towards narcissistic tail-chasing, but let’s keep going.

June Fanon is one of many women the old man is involved with, and a fair amount of time is spent detailing his successes with wild abandon. But it’s all in the past since he’s about to be exiled as part of some mysterious exile program, which is not actually exile, Federman explains, but a dumping of society’s refuse into space. The process is never clearly explained, but it’s very definitely a Holocaust metaphor. The old man is a survivor, and the two fulcrums at work are his hesitation about what has happened in the past, and the haziness and blankness of his upcoming exile. As a contrast we’re offered specifics–his continued anger at Germany, culminating in him expectorating (and worse) on a bed of Deutschmarks, and his rabid activism, all of which are not related to either of his exiles.

The book is driven by a generation of realistic but absurd plots that all proclaim their independence from the mysterious Holocaust and the mysterious exile. Most strikingly, the old man seduces a starlet by telling her the story of a boy narrowly escaping the camps by jumping from one train to another. She’s convinced it’s him: “I know it’s your story, the way you tell it, has to be your story.” He scores, but hates her and hates himself, and continues to insist that it was not him, “just a story.”

The underlying spirit at work, more than Beckett, is that of Edmund Jabes, whom Federman mentions twice. The only part of Beckett present is his playfulness, not the sparseness nor the precision, and without such stark contrast, the result can seem frivolous. “But that’s the point,” a response could go, “to focus on the quotidian which can be described to elucidate what cannot.” Jabes also worked in the space around what he believed he could not speak, and Federman ultimately seems to be marking territory with “Keep out!” signs. The problem is that the lightly comedic quality of the rest of the material references the dark center without illuminating it.

That niggling quality: it is that you can work through pain and suffering and the most awful thing in the world, and you can have fun doing it while making sure to be conscious of the unconscionable past and future, and you can even write all about that, but that elliptical quality that Jabes references, illumination, is, perhaps intentionally, absent. Left instead are pure aesthetics, hovering without reason, seemingly treasured.

Immanuel Wallerstein: Don’t Encourage Him By Proving Him Right

I keep waiting for Immanuel Wallerstein to pop up in the debate on the current troubles, but so far I haven’t seen him around. Wallerstein is the man who has claimed for some time that the United States’s global influence and hegemony has been in inevitable decline for thirty years and its leaders are simply deluding themselves that it will be king of the hill for much longer. Since it’s not the most obvious of theses, his papers appear from time to time with seeming bemusement from people

It’s not my main area of interest or study, but Wallerstein’s argument sure seems to have some problems. He overplays past dominance:

The history books record that World War I broke out in 1914 and ended in 1918 and that World War II lasted from 1939 to 1945. However, it makes more sense to consider the two as a single, continuous “30 years’ war” between the United States and Germany, with truces and local conflicts scattered in between. The competition for hegemonic succession took an ideological turn in 1933, when the Nazis came to power in Germany and began their quest to transcend the global system altogether, seeking not hegemony within the current system but rather a form of global empire.

The second part sounds all right; the first part doesn’t. Wallerstein argues that the U.S. was already a major economic power by 1914–fair enough–but it’s hard to see how the U.S.’s claim to global dominance even became an issue before the 20’s and 30’s. Working with the same evidence and a similar conceptual framework, Karl Polanyi still painted the first war as concertedly Eurocentric. At the time, states didn’t have enough truck with the U.S., and vice versa.

Wallerstein also underplays the U.S.’s current influence. When he says:

In the Balkans and the Middle East alike, the United States has failed to exert its hegemonic clout effectively, not for want of will or effort but for want of real power.

he downplays the ability of the U.S. to help put Israeli ultra-nationalists Effi Eitam and Avigdor Lieberman exactly where they want to be, or at least way closer than prudence would dictate.

But I’m not inclined to get in a debate on the matter, other than to say I think he’s offbase. It’s a slightly more conservative argument than Paul Kennedy’s because Wallerstein seems to invoke qualities of national prestige and posture that are not directly related to economic power. But after a few diplomatic disasters in the last year or so, Wallerstein is starting to look pretty good; in fact, I’d say he looks better than Kennedy, because it hasn’t been economics so much as pure posture that has turned everyone against the U.S. (Marshall has been working overtime discussing this, and there’s still so much more to be said.) In the last section of the article, Wallerstein is able to nicely retrofit his theory without much trouble on the “never thought that would happen” neocon dominance. His analysis of U.S. strongarming in the middle of last year looks extremely prescient:

Yet the U.S. response amounts to little more than arrogant arm-twisting. Arrogance has its own negatives. Calling in chips means leaving fewer chips for next time, and surly acquiescence breeds increasing resentment. Over the last 200 years, the United States acquired a considerable amount of ideological credit. But these days, the United States is running through this credit even faster than it ran through its gold surplus in the 1960s.

But Wallerstein’s position is that the strongarming inevitably used up credit and it failed (in Turkey, Angola, Cameroon, Chile, etc.) because the U.S. simply isn’t as powerful as it thinks it is, and other countries disobeyed because they could. I’m inclined to think that the administration just bungled it; those we strongarmed resisted in spite of fairly notable consequences (or, maybe, resisted because the promises of rewards were totally unreliable, in light of how the administration had already repeatedly screwed Mexico). Wallerstein’s argument, as he says, becomes one of bungling just hastening the inevitable, not wrecking a working piece of machinery.

The neocons actually look worse under Wallerstein’s version for overestimating their country’s position, but it takes some of the blame off of them, since it implies that there probably wasn’t much of a way to get multilateral support for an Iraq war in the first place. Wallerstein does not claim this (well, he didn’t in 2002; I wonder what he is saying now), but he does say that there is far less prestige for the U.S. to squander than is commonly thought. But in general, he seems too pessimistic on the amount of presige right now, and I expect he would claim his estimation as one factor in the inept U.N. wrangling of the last six months. (As much as, say, presenting garbage evidence.) I think he attributes too little power, and thus too little responsibility, to the administration. It still looks like a contingent screw-up, not even a vaguely necessary one. In the short-term, his essential pessimism still looks misplaced. But the diplomatic damage that everyone is talking about and the economic damage that everyone will be talking about look to vindicate him, and we can only hope that his theory isn’t at all useful in removing responsibility for decisions that I suspect are far more decisive than Wallerstein thinks.

Cassandra, Christa Wolf: The Ones to Get It In the Neck

Cassandra‘s concept is simple and thorough: Cassandra, daughter of Priam, the ruler of Troy until its demise, has been brought back by Agamemnon after the war as something of a trophy, and his wife Clytemnestra kills them both for Agamemnon’s “it was for good luck” murder of her daughter Iphigenia. In her last moments before she becomes a bit of collateral damage, she jumps through her past in the Iliad, the Oresteia, and other assorted bits and pieces. The basic plots are covered here.

Wolf’s book is classically revisionist in that it mostly sticks with the material. It is classically feminist in seeing Cassandra and the additional characters of slaves and women as fundamentally oppositional to the male characters of the original stories, and even Clytemnestra, who is one of those women, unlike Cassandra, who never do “stop wearing themselves out trying to integrate themselves into the prevailing delusional systems.” Its additions are ones of interpretation and of layering: notably, Cassandra has an affair with Aeneas in her youth, and he remains a fixture in the book. This is Wolf’s key addition, and the one that produces the most resonance, about which more later. But Wolf also overlays Cassandra’s interactions with servants and the invisible people of Troy, particularly her servant Marpessa. Marpessa is something of a pagan Sappho stand-in who provides Cassandra with the glimpses of an alternative, less “heroic” world that is clearly meant to be superior. Consequently, the hysteria with which she delivers her prophecies comes out less as insanity or desperation than as a fundamental (and willing) disconnection from the world of Priam, Paris, and Hector.

Aside from the overlays, Wolf plays up the escalation aspects of the Trojan War, taking the view that the abduction of Helen was a tit-for-tat response to Priam’s sister Hesione’s willing “abduction” by a Spartan who she has married. The parallels to the Cold War in the 80’s when the book was written (except for a couple of post-colonial elements that get pushed slightly too hard, there is nothing to suggest it couldn’t have been written a few decades earlier) are entirely implicit, but quite apparent. Wolf was a nuclear disarmament unilateralist living in East Germany, and she had no patience for half-measures.

Of course, it’s all seen through Cassandra’s eyes, through tight but mercurial narration, and Wolf’s attention to her rape by Ajax and her identification with the doomed amazons led by Penthesilia, but Cassandra’s personal persecution and the general horrors of the war, for which she is mostly an observer, aren’t resolved. Maybe they couldn’t be. Wolf comes closest with Cassandra’s relationship with Aeneas, marked out as the only real relationship she has had with one of the “heroes.” To Wolf, she shares with him an unwillingness to be a part of the historical narrative, and at the end of the book she signals her acceptance of Aeneas’s unavoidable fate of going down the dark, violent road of the Aeneid to found another empire. Cassandra’s fate as victim and hysterical prophet, as with Aeneas and Penthesilea, is contextually necessary, and Wolf uses that to endorse the other, overlaid context before it is destroyed by the heroes.

It’s a dogmatic book, executed with great skill. The emphatic cry that lies beneath the flowing surface seems to have gone out of fashion, what with Gunter Grass’s missives against German reunification already seeming dated, or at least mistargeted. Wolf’s academic polemicism actually shares more with Amos Oz and David Grossman, those Israeli writers for whom the solution to war is obvious yet completely out of reach, and for whom the approach is fundamentally emotive. But the sensibility has faded elsewhere. It’s not fair to chalk it up to the end of the Eastern Bloc, and the demise of the passion that some (Sergey Kuryokhin is a good example) claimed only came out of repressive states. Part of me thinks it’s about to make a reappearance.

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